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Daring to Protest 
WHEN, WHY, AND HOW RUSSIA’S CITIZENS ENGAGE IN STREET PROTEST 
 
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 333 
August 2014 
 
Tomila Lankina1 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
The December 2011-March 2012 protests in Russia, unprecedented in scale, surprised 
even the most astute observers of Russian politics. Were these protests a mere blip on 
the “normally placid surface of Russian political life”?2 Or are they part of a longer-term 
trajectory of political maturation for Russian society? Do they reveal a growing capacity 
of Russia’s citizens to resort to non-institutionalized forms of political participation, as 
opportunities to influence governance through the ballot box progressively shrink? 
When and under what conditions should we expect protests to erupt again? 
 
An original protest dataset I have assembled helps answer these questions.3 In 2007, the 
liberal-leaning opposition figure Garry Kasparov helped set up a website called 
“namarsh.ru,”which can be roughly translated as “Go and protest!” The website relies 
on a network of regional correspondents to post and repost news on protests occurring 
across Russia. While some overreporting of liberal-leaning activism is likely, given the 
political orientation of those who run the website, the reports do cover protests featuring 
diverse agendas and political groupings. These range from activism that could be 
construed as purely civic in nature, such as when neighborhood residents take to the 
streets to challenge waste dumping, to protests led by activists from the Communist 
Party (KPRF) and other opposition parties and groups. Altogether, some 5,100 protest 
events were reported between April 2007, when the first protest entry was posted, and 
December 2013. 
 
1 I am grateful to Alisa Voznaya for her excellent work on the dataset and her comments on this memo, and 
to Katerina Tertychnaya for her valuable help with data input and coding. I am also very grateful to the 
LSE’s International Relations Department, LSE Research Committee, and to the LSE Suntory and Toyota 
International Centers for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) for providing generous funding for 
this research. 
2 Lilia Shevtsova, “Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution?“ Journal of Democracy 23, 3 (2012): 19-32. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the data, see Tomila Lankina, “The Dynamics of Regional and National 
Contentious Politics in Russia: Evidence from a New Dataset, “ forthcoming in Problems of Post-Communism. 
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The data reveal temporal variations in the kinds of causes that people rally around 
which correspond to broader socioeconomic, institutional, and political changes 
occurring over time in Russia. We see from Figure 1 that protests with a pronounced 
economic component peaked in 2008-2009, corresponding to the shock wave of the 
global economic crisis. Following the post-crisis economic recovery, protests with 
socioeconomic demands and agendas declined. Protests coded as civic—that is, those 
dealing with environmental, cultural, or legal issues4—show a more consistent, flatter 
trajectory over time. Furthermore, in line with the findings of political scientist Graeme 
Robertson, who employed data from a left-leaning opposition website run by the 
Institute of Collective Action (Institut kollektivnogo deystviya, IKD), civic protests 
constitute a substantial chunk of protest activism.5 The data also reveal a steady rise in 
number of protests with an explicitly political agenda in the years and months leading 
up to the mass protests that erupted in December 2011, as well as a decline in political 
activism after the re-election of Vladimir Putin to his third presidential term in March 
2012. Despite the subsequent restrictions imposed by the Russian government and the 
resulting decrease in protests, as Figures 2 and 3 show, the number of protests and 
people taking to the streets again rose in the second half of 2013. This record might be 
explained by a temporary reopening of the political space in advance of the Sochi Winter 
Olympic Games, which were preceded by the release from prison of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and members of the Pussy Riot group. The most interesting trend that 
emerges from these data is the apparent metamorphosis of civic protest into political 
activism during the winter of 2011-12 (percentages of types of activism by year for the 
entire period are contained in Figure 4). This is followed by a swift reversal of the trend 
after March 2012: the shrinkage of politicized protest as a share of overall protest 
activism appears to correspond to the (re)expansion of activism that is framed not in 
political terms but in terms of a diverse range of civic agendas. In 2013, specifically, the 
ratio of political protests vis-à-vis other types of protests recalibrated to a much more 
balanced spectrum of protest activity, with civic protests lagging only slightly behind 
political ones.     
 
These trends suggest the presence of a latent constituency for protest that is largely 
hidden from the public eye and mainstream media spotlight as it engages in “safe” 
forms of activism during periods of political repression and/or closure, only to re-
emerge again when openings occur in what social movement theorists refer to as 
“political opportunity structures.” It is well known that the rise in politicized contention 
corresponded to the liberal opening under the interim presidency of Dmitry Medvedev 
in 2008-2012. The election of Putin to his third presidential term in March 2012 was 
4 Protests concerned with legal issues target unpopular legislation and its implementation (labor, criminal 
and administrative codes); the category also includes protests against illegal acts by state bodies or private 
companies (forced eviction, construction in inappropriate areas). Environmental protests include those that 
target hazardous work conditions, waste dumping, and destruction of forests, parks, and protected 
woodlands. Cultural protests include street rallies against the destruction of monuments and historically 
valuable buildings and sites and against changes in city or area names. 
5 Graeme Robertson, “Protesting Putinism,“ Problems of Post-Communism 60, 2 (2013): 11-23. 
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followed by a crackdown unprecedented in scale against protesters and political 
opposition. This crackdown is epitomized by the trials of the “Bolotnaya” protestors, 
named after the square in Moscow around which anti-regime protests and disturbances 
occurred on May 6, 2012, which some experts have likened to Stalin’s show trials.6 The 
trials were initiated ostensibly due to protester violence against the police and have 
already resulted in nine jail sentences, arrests of a further twelve activists, and 
surveillance and travel restrictions on at least four other individuals. The repression and 
crackdown on street protests that followed Putin’s re-election is systematically recorded 
in my dataset. As shown in Figure 3, a substantially higher share of protest activity after 
March 2012, as compared to the earlier time periods, became subject to repression in the 
form of arrests of protesters, attempts to disrupt events by pro-Kremlin groups (by, for 
example, the youth group Nashi), police harassment, and other disruptive activities.   
 
By highlighting how protest repression might encourage protesters to alter the key 
demands articulated in a protest, I do not imply that these demands are completely 
divorced from citizens’ particular grievances. Indeed, as noted above, in times of 
economic hardship more people are likely to rally around bread-and-butter issues like 
layoffs, wage arrears, or delays in payment of salaries. Most ordinary people—at all 
times—may well perceive problems in their locality or neighborhood as having the most 
pressing and tangible effects on their lives. What the data trends seem also to suggest, 
however, is that particularly when political repression increases, there may be a greater 
tendency to (re)frame or (re)articulate grievances in more particularistic-local-parochial 
terms and re-channel blame away from national leaders and onto their sub-national 
clients or other lesser officials in the periphery: the corrupt municipal officials who 
enrich themselves by generating kickbacks from illegal construction projects on 
beautiful nature reserves; the private companies that dupe citizens into paying for 
apartment blocks that never get completed, and then get away with it because of the 
complicity or inaction of municipal and regional officials; or reckless drivers of official 
luxury vehicles sporting ubiquitous blue flashing lights (migalki) and endangering 
pedestrians and other vehicles.7   
 
Why should we pay attention to the observed fluidity in protest issues and the question 
of whom protesters blame for their grievances? In an earlier PONARS memo analyzing 
the sustainability of the momentum generated by the December 2011-March 2012 
protests, Mark Kramer rightly highlighted the importance of the development of 
6 As discussed by Nikolay Petrov at the Comparative Workshop on Mass Protests, June 13-14, 2014, LSE, 
London. 
7 Putin’s soaring popularity after Crimea’s annexation notwithstanding, public opinion surveys reveal 
constant—and even growing—levels of disaffection with corruption, lawlessness, and lack of accountability 
at all levels of governance. For recent Levada Center surveys of citizen satisfaction with government 
performance, see “Kto ne odobryaet deyatel’nost’ prezidenta,” June 24, 2014, http://www.levada.ru/24-06-
2014/kto-ne-odobryaet-deyatelnost-prezidenta. 
3 
                                                          
“abeyance structures.”8 These structures unite protesters into something more or less 
whole and coherent, enabling and nurturing continuity in between phases of contention 
that could be separated by months or even years. Our data may not reveal the 
development of a coherent set of structures, ideologies, and leadership unifying 
protesters, but it does suggest the presence of constituencies for protest—however 
disparate—that continue accumulating what Robertson refers to as the human capital 
and skills toolkit of protest in between spikes in contention.9 The existence of such 
protesting constituencies may be regarded as an important constant, even if the causes 
and targets that the same individuals take on are fluid, shifting, and adaptable to the 
institutional and political environments in which they operate. Sociologist Georgi 
Derlugian has also highlighted the importance of paying attention to this phenomenon 
by tracing the life histories of quintessential Soviet and post-Soviet activists in the 
Caucasus: a Brezhnev-era activist in pursuit of relatively safe issues (like the 
environment or youth health) becomes a democrat in the perestroika era and a nationalist 
demonstrator in post-Soviet times. 10  These patterns are illustrative of the adaptive 
capacity of citizens to change the way in which they articulate grievances in an 
authoritarian regime—and their potential to unite in large-scale protest as circumstances 
change. 
 
Under what conditions, then, should we expect to see a rechanneling of non-political 
forms of protest into the kinds of mass anti-regime contentious politics observed on the 
streets of Russia between December 2011 and March 2012? Prior scholarship on protests 
in other settings and analyses of Russia’s “December Movement” 11  highlight the 
centrality of elite splits in generating political protest-enabling openings; rival elite 
factions not only can help rally protesters around political causes but also ensure their 
relative safety by association—as when, for instance, they are flanked by influential 
political figures such as former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin who joined the 2011 
protests.  
 
The sanctions imposed on Russia following its annexation of Crimea and allegations of 
support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine may have already generated intra-elite 
grievances that are simmering behind the façade of a patriotic and nationalist consensus. 
Evidence of the Kremlin’s sensitivity to potential grievances of the bureaucratic elite—
and hence perception of the fragility of its loyalty to Putin—is its decision to pursue its 
8 “Political Protest and Regime-Opposition Dynamics in Russia,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 280, 
September 2013, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/political-protest-and-regime-opposition-
dynamics-russia. 
9 Graeme Robertson, “Protesting Putinism.“ 
10 Georgi M. Derluguian, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
11 Lilia Shevtsova, “Implosion, Atrophy, or Revolution?“ Journal of Democracy 23 (3) 2012: 19-32. 
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campaign to limit property ownership abroad by government officials with a relatively 
light touch.12  
 
As more stringent international sanctions are imposed on Russia, and a wider circle of 
officials is affected, the patriotic consensus may well crumble in the face of lost 
opportunities to vacation or access bank accounts abroad. Sanctions may also affect the 
economic well-being of ordinary citizens as foreign investment into the Russian 
economy shrinks. Socioeconomic grievances of ordinary citizens could intensify street 
activism of the bread-and-butter kind. A combination of political openings—if and when 
they occur—and mounting socioeconomic grievances are likely to encourage the 
metamorphosis of non-political forms of protest—already a routine occurrence in 
Russia’s neighborhoods and cities, as my data demonstrate—into more overt forms of 
political contention.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Protests by Category, March 2007-December 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
12 For instance, rather than banning property ownership by state officials abroad, Putin allowed the 
ownership of real estate by state officials abroad as long as property was declared. Discussed by Elizabeth 
Teague at the Comparative Workshop on Mass Protests, June 13-14, 2014, LSE, London. 
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Figure 2. Number of People Participating in Protests, March 2007-December 2013 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of Protests and Suppressions, March 2007-December 2013 
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Figure 4. Type of Protest, March 2007-December 2013 
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